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Abstract—The privacy of voice over IP (VoIP) systems is
achieved by compressing and encrypting the sampled data. This
paper investigates in detail the leakage of information from
Skype, a widely used VoIP application. In this research, it has
been demonstrated by using the dynamic time warping (DTW)
algorithm, that sentences can be identified with an accuracy
of 60%. The results can be further improved by choosing
specific training data. An approach involving the Kalman filter
is proposed to extract the kernel of all training signals.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, the evolution of voice over IP (VoIP)
has been tremendous. The fact that it is free of charge, easy
to use and apparently secure has promoted this technology
among the population. Quickly, however, groups, with illegal
or criminal intent, realized the potential of using VoIP as a
covert channel. This has led several federal agencies, such as
the National Security Agency (NSA) and the German Federal
Police, and recently the European Union to demand the ability
to eavesdrop on VoIP conversations. However, several service
providers reject these demands without a legal warrant, to
preserve privacy rights. Therefore, alternative methods, such as
using domain specific knowledge to determine whether a given
person uses sentences like “I put the bomb in the train”, have
to be found to enable law enforcement to acquire an indication
that might help to obtain a warrant for further investigations.
As VoIP becomes increasingly used for professional pur-
poses, the need for most people think, an encrypted VoIP
conversation does not completely prevent an attacker from
eavesdropping. Using only side channel knowledge such as
packet sizes or inter-arrival times, this paper demonstrates
the false sense of privacy provided by Skype. To ensure
the validity of the proposed results, more than 6 GB of
Skype traces have been collected as training and test material.
This paper investigates how an eavesdropper can determine
the content of an encrypted VoIP conversation. This goal is
achieved by identifying particular sentences in the flow of
Internet Protocol (IP) packets using algorithms from speech
processing, such as dynamic time warping (DTW), and from
radar tracking analysis, such as the Kalman filter.
This paper is organized as follows: some related work
concerning VoIP security and encryption is briefly presented in
Section I-A. The motivation is explained in Section I-B. The
methodology is presented in Section II, including the experi-
mental setup and the requisite background for understanding
the algorithms proposed. The results are discussed in Section
III. Finally, the conclusion is presented in Section IV.
A. Related Work
Literature shows that privacy is not yet fully guaranteed with
VoIP, as illustrated by number of published papers, ranging
from inferring speech activity to identifying sentences or the
language of the conversation.
A traditional speaker identification system usually has to de-
compress the compressed stream before being able to analyze
it. Aggarwal et al. [1] show that decompression can be avoided.
This challenging goal is achieved by using a so-called micro-
clustering algorithm, detailed in [2]. They reach an accuracy of
80% with a three times higher speed than the Gaussian mixture
model (GMM), used in the traditional approach. Moreover,
they are able to recognize the speaker in real time after five
seconds of seeing the first packet in a stream.
In order to maintain user datagram protocol (UDP) bindings
at the network address translation (NAT) and to obtain better
voice quality, Skype does not suspend sending packets during
silence. This means that silence is encoded, encrypted and sent
over the network, therefore complicating the task of inferring
speech activity, a process commonly called voice activity
detection (VAD). Nevertheless, Chang et al. [3] propose a
method they named network-level VAD to infer speech activity
from encrypted voice traffic. Their work is based on the
fact that speech activity is highly correlated with the size of
encrypted packets, i.e., more information is encoded in a voice
packet while the user is speaking than while the user is silent.
In their paper, they devise an adaptive thresholding algorithm
allowing silence to be differentiated from voice activity with
an accuracy of 85%.
In their paper Privacy of Encrypted Voice-over-IP that
focuses on Google Talk, Lella and Bettati [4] assume that
the packet sizes do not carry any information but that all the
information is contained in the inter-arrival times. They use
the silence phases, which are encoded in smaller packets and
with bigger inter-arrival times, to isolate words. Then, they
compare the length of the words, namely the timestamp of the
last packet belonging to the word minus the timestamp of the
This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE Globecom 2010 proceedings.
first one, against their models. Their first approach, based on a
simple Bayesian classifier, is context unaware. Subsequently,
they propose a second approach based on hidden Markov
models (HMMs) to produce context awareness. A drawback to
their approach is that a congested network or a slow or lossy
link will render their attack ineffective. Moreover, it relies on
human analysis to determine the plausibility of the proposed
sentence.
Wright et al. [5] propose to use the size of transmitted
packets to determine whether a given phrase is spoken. By
reducing speech to phonemes, the most basic speech unit,
they are able, using HMMs, to reconstruct sentences using
the sequence of packet lengths. By reducing the problem of
encrypted VoIP speech recognition to a substring matching
problem on the packet sizes, the authors are able to achieve
an average accuracy of 50% in telling whether a sentence is
contained in a stream of packets. By choosing some phonet-
ically rich sentences, such as “Young children should avoid
exposure to contagious diseases”, they achieve an accuracy
above 90%. By using a similar approach and a variant of the
χ2 test, the authors have also demonstrated that determining
the language of an encrypted conversation is possible [6].
Their algorithm achieves an accuracy of 66% in identifying
the language of a conversation among a set of 21 models.
Furthermore, 14 languages can be identified with an accuracy
greater than 90%. Finally, their algorithm achieves an overall
binary classification rate of 86.6% However, a significant
limitation to their approach is that it needs the binary of the
audio codec used and requires the VoIP application to encode
voice using a variable bit rate (VBR) codec and a length
preserving encryption mechanism.
To conclude, many experiments have been conducted on
this topic that do not take account of the time dependency of
the packet signals. The work presented in this paper will now
show that it is a factor with information gain even without the
availability of the codec.
B. Motivation
This paper addresses the challenge of extracting information
from encrypted VoIP traffic. Although several studies have
already tackled this issue, none of them have tried to attack
Skype or other closed source codecs. This represents a real
challenge as the measurement and process noise have to
be taken into account. This requires the investigation into
preprocessing methods able to remove, attenuate or take the
effect of noise into account.
The efficiency of the approach presented in [4] is strongly
dependent on the quality of the network. Furthermore, sen-
tences of similar lengths cannot be reliably identified. This
paper overcomes this restriction by focusing on packet sizes
rather than inter-arrival times. In addition, it is proposed
that by using the DTW algorithm presented in Section II-B,
variability in time or speed can be efficiently dealt with.
Furthermore, unlike HMMs, the DTW algorithm does not
require an extensive amount of training data to work properly.
This means that a single occurrence of a sentence spoken by
a known speaker might theoretically be sufficient to generate
a model for this particular speaker.
Experiments have shown that the approach proposed in [5]
does not work with Skype traffic as the encoding of phoneme
depends strongly on the surrounding sounds. Furthermore, the
approaches proposed in [5] and [6] require the possession
of a binary of the audio codec to create a match between
the VBR output and the encrypted packet length. However,
several audio codecs are closed source and do not share
their binary. Without a binary, such a mapping could not be
created. The non-availability of the codec renders the attack
more difficult, and this clearly creates an issue that cannot
be solved by the approach proposed in [5] or [6]. Indeed, to
investigate unknown or closed source codecs, methods that
eliminate the influence of the encryption algorithm have to be
developed. The strength of the methodology presented in this
paper compared to the referenced techniques is that it can be
applied to any VoIP application, regardless of the availability
of the codec’s binary.
II. METHODOLOGY
All experiments are conducted on Skype version 4.0.0.224
working in direct UDP mode. The laboratory setup is com-
posed of two Microsoft Windows XP workstations. This
choice is lead by the desire to work on the latest technologies
offered by Skype, mainly its new audio codec SILK and to
provide results valid for as many users as possible. Some
prerecorded speech is played on one side, while all the traffic
between the two stations is captured using WinDump [7].
To facilitate the analysis process, Skype is operated in direct
UDP mode and in a noise-free environment. Furthermore,
synthetic speech, being close to the nature of Skype’s vocoder,
is being used. Finally, several recordings of the model are
created. By observing IP traces of Skype conversations, it
has been determined that information is carried in the time-
dependent flow of packet lengths. The number of packets and
the amount of bytes transferred have been identified as features
relating to a given sentence. Perceiving the sequence of packets
as a signal inspired the application of methods from speech
processing or radar signal analysis.
An extensive analysis of the packet sizes used by encrypted
Skype traffic revealed that a given sentence is always encoded
in a similar way, and conversely, different sentences produce
different outputs as illustrated in Figure 1. This is an important
observation as it implies that, in order to determine the most
probable model, an algorithm able to compare sequences of
packets is sufficient. The DTW algorithm has been chosen for
this purpose.
In order to avoid the generation of several speaker models
per sentence, the Kalman filter is used toward the generation
of speaker-independent models. To begin with, the first ob-
servation is chosen as the initial estimator of the state of the
system, and then, the Kalman filter is recursively applied to the
training data. Finally, the DTW algorithm is used to compare
the test data against the Kalman’s models.
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Fig. 1. Different sentences, different outputs
A. Limitations and Assumptions
All the experiments are conducted using the English lan-
guage, since it is the most common one on the Internet.
Nevertheless, this work can be adapted to analyze streams of
any other language.
Although it is focused on Skype, this work can be adapted to
any other existing VoIP software. Skype works independently
of the network topology and security measures. In order to
focus on the vital part, the content appraisal from IP packets,
this work concentrates first on the ideal case without a firewall
or NAT. This also prevents too many unknown variables
from influencing the experiments. To simplify the experiments
and in order to understand the fundamental principles behind
Skype traffic, this work focuses on an idealistic case. First,
it is assumed that the direct UDP mode is used. This setup
has been chosen because it is the one that induces the least
interferences, e.g., delays and losses. However, it is not the
most common in the Internet.
Second, samples of prerecorded synthetic speech are used,
which do not vary between the different experiments. In
practice, speech is dynamic, and a sentence uttered by the
same speaker will not always sound exactly the same way.
Third, a conversation is only defined by the audio traces of
Skype, i.e., no text messages, file transfer or video embedded.
B. Background
In this section, the algorithms relevant to the present attack
method are briefly presented. The two key algorithms used
are dynamic time warping (DTW) and the Kalman filter.
Several references are provided for anyone requiring a deeper
understanding of those algorithms.
1) Dynamic Time Warping (DTW): DTW is a dynamic
programming algorithm allowing sequences, possibly of dif-
ferent length, to be compared. Therefore, DTW is an algorithm
suitable for comparing two sequences that may vary in time
or speed. It has been extensively used, especially in speech
processing before being substituted by HMMs.
The result of the DTW algorithm comes in many forms.
The first one is a value representing the distance, i.e., the
correlation factor, between both sequences. The closer to zero
this distance is, the more similar the input sequences are. It
also supplies a graphical representation, displaying a matrix
of size m × n, where the abscissa represents one sequence
and the ordinate axis the other one. Each cell (i, j) of the
matrix is colored according to the distance dist(xi, yj), e.g.,
the Euclidean distance between xi and yj . The “colder” the
color, the smaller the distance. The optimal DTW path is
marked by a white line. A perfect match describes a straight
line from the upper left of the matrix to the bottom right,
namely the point (m,n). More details on the DTW algorithm
can be found in [8] and [9].
2) Kalman Filter: The Kalman filter is a recursive linear
filter that estimates the state of a linear, discrete-time dynam-
ical system from a series of noisy measurements. Basically,
the goal of the algorithm is, given the current state of the
system, to predict the next state and its uncertainty. Then,
the prediction is corrected with the new measured values. It
is mainly used for radar or missile tracking problems but is
also widely used in computer vision, economics and navigation
(aerospace, land and marine). The filter combines all available
measurement data, plus prior knowledge about the system
and measuring devices and can be used to adaptively filter
and predict a discrete-time linear process. Moreover, it can be
shown that the Kalman filter is the optimal linear filter, namely
the one that minimizes most the variance of the estimation
error. Details on the original proposals for using Kalman filters
can be found in [10] and [11], while more recent work and
development can be found in [12].
III. RESULTS
As mentioned in the previous section, a first encouraging
observation is the coherence and reproducibility of the experi-
ments. By analysing the sequence of IP packets generated for
an experiment run several times under the same conditions,
only minor changes can be observed. This proves that Skype
does not generate random packet sizes as the output appears
to be deterministic.
In order to evaluate sentences, reference models are required
for comparison with the recordings under examination. Exper-
iments have shown that the inter-arrival time evolves from 60
ms to 40 ms to finally reach 20 ms. This behavior appears to be
due to the adaptive nature of the codec learning to differentiate
silence and noise from speech. Therefore, the models are
generated by a WAVE file consisting of three occurrences of
a sentence separated by 30 seconds of silence, so sentences
can easily be extracted from the training data.
Then, labeled data is generated, namely several speech
samples are recorded in which the given sentence appears in
different positions. By manually extracting the given sentence
from the traces, the DTW algorithm, presented in Section
II-B1, can successfully be used to detect the sentence. Figures
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2 and 3 show the graphic results of the DTW experiment for a
non-matching sentence and a matching sentence, respectively.
Recall that, as explained in Section II-B, a perfect match would
result in a straight line through the diagonal. The smaller
graphs on the left and the bottom of each DTW graph represent
the input sequences, respectively, the model and the test data.
Fig. 2. A non matching DTW path
Fig. 3. A matching DTW path
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the content appraisal
attack proposed, several models are generated for sentences
chosen to illustrate the ability to detect and distinguish even
similar sentences from encrypted Skype traces. Variations of
the sentences “I put the bomb in the plane” were used, as
they present an obvious interest to law enforcement. The other
sentences have been chosen for their length or the similarity
of the content to this initial sentence. Finally, the following
test set is used as an input to the sentence detector:
1) Although always alone we survive,
2) Biblical scholars argue history,
3) I put the bomb in the bus,
4) I put the bomb in the plane,
5) I put the bomb in the tower,
6) I put the bomb in the train,
7) The bomb is in the train,
8) The Thinker is a famous sculpture,
9) There is a bomb in the train.
The test set is composed of 6 experiments, namely of all the
possible permutations of sentences 1, 2 and 6. This allows the
testing of the models against 18 samples (namely 3 sentences
* 3! permutations). By creating models and extracting sen-
tences manually, two sentences out of three (66%) have been
correctly identified. If model 3 is removed, then an accuracy
above 70% can be reached. It is also interesting to note
that the results could have been improved by using different
models and test data. For example, in the case (2, 1, 6), 6
was identified as 3. If model 3 is removed, the sentence is
correctly identified. This can be explained by the similarity
of the sentences 3 and 6, differing only in the last word.
Furthermore, the DTW algorithm has also been tested against
sentences longer than the model, and as expected, each time
the resulting distance was too big to be accepted as a match.
This means that the recall and precision of the method can
easily be improved by generating models for sentences that
differ in duration.
A given sentence is not always encoded exactly the same
way; therefore, by generating several models per sentence, an
83% correct identification rate has been achieved. However,
the need to generate several models per sentence is not practi-
cal as the number of different models is potentially unbounded
due to the variability of speech and noise. Therefore, in the
next section, the use of the Kalman filter is proposed in order
to extract the kernel of all signals.
A. Speaker Independent Models Using the Kalman Filter
The effect of the Kalman filter, introduced in Section II-B2,
on four occurrences of the sentence “Although always alone,
we survive” is illustrated in Figure 4. Although not obvious
in the figure, a problem faced with this approach is that the
training and test data do not always have the same length.
This is particularly true between different speakers. Indeed,
the model will be as long as the longest sample in the training
set. Depending on the difference in size between the sample
and the model to be compared against, there is a chance
of misclassifying the sentence. Therefore, a slightly different
approach is taken. The idea is not to compare the model
against the sample, but rather to measure the distortion of the
model when updated with the sample.
Fig. 4. Model generation using the Kalman filter
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Let m be the model generated by the Kalman filter and s
the test data to compare against the model. Then, the Kalman
model is updated with the test data: k′ = Kalman(m, s). This
means that m is the model and k′ is the model corrected with
the test data. Now, the distance between m and k′ is computed
with DTW, as it was done before without Kalman.
Matching sentences should not distort the model too much,
while non-matching sentences should induce more variations.
However, the problem observed with this approach is that the
Kalman filter does not weight the sample enough. Therefore,
no matter how different the test data and the model are, the
distortion was minimal and the DTW algorithm inefficient.
To approach this problem, the input parameters, such as the
covariance of the estimation error, were adjusted. The values
were selected in the interval of (0, 1], but none of them
produced satisfying results. This can be explained by the
assumptions inherent to the Kalman filter, which assumes that
both the process and the measurement noise are additive,
white and Gaussian with zero mean. In the case of Skype,
the measurement and process noise are unknown. Therefore,
the assumptions made by the Kalman filter might lack the
precision necessary to describe the actual noise faced by
Skype.
The primary objective of the presented research was the
demonstration (proof of concept) that significant information
is leaked from Skype conversations. Therefore, further opti-
mization of the above approach is considered as future research
on speaker-independent speech recognition. Albeit there is a
limited amount of testing and a small set of targeted sentences,
this research work highlights the fact that extraction of infor-
mation from encrypted VoIP conversations can be achieved
without relying on the availability of public information on
the codec, encryption, etc. to attempt a successful side channel
attack.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has demonstrated the false sense of privacy
provided by Skype, a widely used VoIP application, known for
its strong security policy. Through a comprehensive analysis
of encrypted Skype traffic, it has been shown that isolated
phonemes can be classified and given sentences identified with
an accuracy greater than 60%. An accuracy of 83% can be
reached under specific conditions. This challenging goal is
achieved with the help of the DTW algorithm, commonly
used in the speech processing community. The algorithm is
successfully applied on vectors of packet sizes, allowing the
probability of a recording being a particular sentence to be
determined. Furthermore, the Kalman filter, traditionally used
for radar tracking problems, has been proposed to extract
the kernel of the training data in order to generate speaker
independent models.
To the knowledge of the authors, this is the first pub-
lished research that demonstrates that Skype encryption is
not entirely secure and that information is leaked allowing
content to be inferred. In addition, dealing with one of the
most challenging VoIP software constructs currently available
and proposing a methodology easily adaptable to any other
VoIP software means the proposed approach is very versatile.
Furthermore, by using the DTW algorithm, the drawbacks of
an approach involving HMMs, e.g., an extensive amount of
training data, can be avoided. Also, the capacity of DTW to
deal with time or speed variability along with the use of packet
sizes as discriminant features renders the proposed approach
stronger than the one described in [4]. Finally, because Skype
is closed source and its audio codec is not widely published,
the approach proposed in [5] and [6] could not have been
applied. Therefore, it has been necessary to study alternate
methods able to attenuate or take the effect of noise into
account.
Another interesting study to conduct would be to design a
speaker identification or verification system. Speaker identi-
fication addresses the problem of determining who is talking
from a set of known speakers, while speaker verification is
concerned with the problem of verifying that the speaker
is really the person they purport to be. Any other profiling
information might also be of interest, especially for law
enforcement agencies. So far, only the language identification
issue has been addressed [6], although not for Skype. However,
based on the results of this paper, age, gender, language or
emotion detection also seems feasible for Skype.
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